My areas of interest are matching theory and market design. Matching theory studies how to organize matching mechanisms that achieve social goals such as efficiency and fairness, and market design applies theory to practical problems in society. My recent research topics are as follows: (1) I studied asymptotic behavior of matching mechanisms as the number of market participants grow, and applied the theory to evaluate robustness of labor matching mechanisms in the U.S. (2) I am developing a theory of “matching with constraints” and applying it to propose mechanisms that improves the matching outcomes in medical match and daycare (nursery school) allocation problems in Japan.
2020- Professor, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo
2009-2020 (assistant, associate, then full) Professor in Economics, Stanford University
2008-2009 Postdoc, Yale University
2003-2008 PhD in Economics, Harvard University
1998-2003 B.A. in Economics, University of Tokyo
1) “Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets” (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp. 608-27.
2) “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications” (2013), with Eric Budish, Yeon-Koo Che, and Paul Milgrom, American Economic Review 103, pp. 585-623.
3) “Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets” (2013), with Parag A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (4), pp. 1585-1632. doi:10.1093/qje/qjt019
4) “Efficient Matching Under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications” (2015), with Yuichiro Kamada, American Economic Review 105 (1), pp. 67-99. doi:10.1257/aer.20101552
Japanese Economic Association Nakahara Prize,
Japan Academy Academic Award
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Prize
Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize
Social Choice and Welfare Prize
Sloan Research Fellow
International Journal of Economic Theory Lionel W. McKenzie Prize
Presidential Scholarship, Harvard University
Ouchi Hyoe Award for the Best Undergraduate Thesis, University of Tokyo Presidential Award, University of Tokyo